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COMMENT
CHARLES J. COOPER*

Professor Schlesinger's paper reads to me like two papers. The
first half is devoted largely to defending our constitutional system of
separation of powers against the arguments favoring establishment
of a new order based more nearly on the parliamentary model. He
cites the work of the Commission on the Constitutional System,
which has managed to attract a good deal of attention to its ideas in
this bicentennial year. I agree with Professor Schlesinger's conclusion-which occurs about midway in the paper-that "the separation of powers has caused its share of problems. But in the main it
has worked well enough."'
I agree with Professor Schlesinger that the founders were wise
to create a system of separated powers because the risks of tyranny
are too high if all governmental power is concentrated in one individual or institution. Moreover, the system of checks and balances
that they developed, on the whole, strikes the right balance. (I have
had my doubts, however, about whether the Constitution should
permit the Senate to give its advice and consent to the appointment
of Assistant Attorneys General!) In particular, the veto power has
surely saved the American people from many bad laws, and the ratification power has equally surely saved the American people from
many bad treaties.
But while I find nothing particularly objectionable in the first
half of the paper, neither do I find anything which is particularly
profound or illuminating-in marked contrast to many of Professor
Schlesinger's other writings which have earned him a well-deserved
scholarly reputation. Indeed, the first half of his paper seems
designed not so much to examine the constitutional issues, as to
provide a quasi-academic background, or excuse, to share with us in
this academic forum the ideological polemic that is the second half
of his paper.
With respect to the latter half of his paper, I have several partic* Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department
of justice. B.S., University of Alabama, 1974; J.D., 1977. The author would like to acknowledge gratefully the assistance of Bruce D. Lindsay in the preparation of this
comment.
1. Schlesinger, The Constitution and Presidential Leadership, 47 MD. L. REV. 54, 64
(1987).
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ular objections and one general objection. Let me begin with my
particular objections-objections which concern Professor Schlesinger's frenzied effort to show that President Ronald Reagan violated numerous laws and his constitutional oath of office. 2
First, I would like to comment on Professor Schlesinger's discussion of the "Intelligence Finding," a mechanism by which the
President and only the President may authorize a covert intelligence
activity. Professor Schlesinger describes the Intelligence Finding as
"[a]n especially pernicious device, unknown to the Constitution and
very far indeed from the original intent about which the Attorney
General lectures us so often."' "[T]he Intelligence Finding," he
continues, "offers a negligent or unscrupulous President a way of
secretly and unilaterally violating the law. As employed by President Reagan this device is a blow to the system of accountability and
to the balance of the Constitution."' Indeed, according to Professor Schlesinger, the current administration has seized on this "pernicious device" to establish "a government of decrees-and secret
5
decrees at that."
"

But where-one may ask-did this extraordinary instrument of
tyranny originate? Is this some nefarious creation of the Executive?
It might surprise Professor Schlesinger's readers to discover that
the "Intelligence Finding" is, in fact, a congressional invention.
Specifically, it is contained in a 1974 federal statute that prohibits
the use of appropriated funds to support covert intelligence projects
"unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States." 6 This 1974
law is the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which was enacted to
ensure Presidential decisionmaking and thus accountability in the
aftermath of revelations regarding CIA activities in the 1970s.
How, in Professor Schlesinger's description, this quite reasonable statutory provision becomes the tool for unscrupulous and unilateral violations of law is something to behold. Because the
2. Many of the statutory issues raised by Professor Schlesinger are discussed more
fully in two memoranda which I prepared for Attorney General Edwin Meese III. These
memoranda have been released to the public. See Memorandum for the Attorney General: The President's Compliance with the "Timely Notification" Requirement of Section 501(b) of the National Security Act (Dec. 17, 1986); Memorandum for the Attorney
General: Legal Authority for Recent Covert Arms Transfers to Iran (Dec. 17, 1986)
(both available at the laryland Law Review) [hereinafter Legal Authority].
3. Schlesinger, supra note 1,at 67.
4. Id. at 68.
5. Id. at 67.
6. 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (a) (1982).
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requirement is not inherently evil, Professor Schlesinger is forced to
invent violations of it. He focuses, for instance, on the "celebrated"
Finding of January 17, 1986, in which the President authorized the
Iran initiative. In that Finding, according to Schlesinger,
the President "found" that selling arms to Iran was important to the national security and found also that the Finding
should be kept secret from the congressional intelligence
committees that the law obligated him to inform. The
Tower Commission reproduces the Finding, including this
interesting sentence: "I ...direct the Director of Central
Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the
Congress." 7
Professor Schlesinger's truncated quotation is seriously misleading,
for it suggests that the President permanently enjoined disclosure of
the Finding to Congress. The sentence that Professor Schlesinger
finds so "interesting" is less so when read in full:
[D]ue to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is essential to limit priornotice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this
Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.8
Thus, as is indicated by the portion of the text that Professor
Schlesinger fails to quote, section 501 of the National Security Act
expressly authorizes the President to do precisely what he did in the
January 17 Finding-withhold prior notice from Congress. Congress itself recognized that there would be instances in which national security considerations would make it inadvisable to provide
prior notice. Therefore, it authorized the President, in section 501,
to provide subsequent notice of intelligence operations to Congress
when, in his judgment, national security considerations did not permit prior notice. 9 Moreover, it is worth noting that this was the only
7. Schlesinger, supra note 1,at 67.
8. Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection (Jan. 17, 1986) (emphasis added).

9. National Security Act § 501(a), 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1982), provides for prior notice to Congress. National Security Act § 501 (b), 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (1982), then makes
specific provisions for situations in which "prior notice was not given under subsection
(a)." Because subsection (a) includes situations in which the President provides notice
to the full Intelligence Committees under subsection (a)(I)(A) and situations in which he
provides prior notice restricted to designated members of Congress, including the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees under
subsection (a)(l)(B), it is clear that subsection (b) contemplates situations in which no
prior notice has been given under either of the provisions.
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instance in which this President has determined that it was necessary
to withhold prior notice from Congress.
Professor Schlesinger next accuses the President, wrongly, of
not even reading the Finding before signing it. Quoting the Tower
Commission Report, he states:
[A]s the President himself confessed, without, it must be
said, great shame, "though he was briefed on the contents
of the memorandum [he signed] . . . he did not read it."

This is an old Hollywood habit. When a well-known film
producer, who was contemplating a film based on Henry
James' The Wings of a Dove, was asked whether he had read
the book, he answered, "Well, not personally."'"
What the relevant page of the Tower Commission Report said is
this:
The President signed a new Finding .

.

.on January

17. He told the Board on January 26, 1987, that the Finding was presented to him under cover of a memorandum
from Poindexter of the same date. The President said he
was briefed on the contents of the memorandum but stated
that he did not read it. "
The Tower Commission Report is quite clear-not easily mistaken is the
distinction between the January 17 Finding, which the President
read and signed, and the cover memorandum, which he did not
read. Perhaps Professor Schlesinger himself did not have the time
to get around to reading the page of the Tower Commission Report
which he cites for the proposition that the President did not read the
Finding. Perhaps that's an old Cambridge habit.
Furthermore, Professor Schlesinger says that the law requires
that Findings be reduced to writing. Unfortunately, there is a problem with Professor Schlesinger's criticism-he's wrong on the law.
A careful review of the text and legislative history of the HughesRyan Amendment yields the confident conclusion that it was carefully worded to ensure that a written Finding would not be
required. '

2

10. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 67-68 (footnote omitted).
11. Report of the President's Special Review Board at B-65 (1987) [hereinafter Tower Commission Report].
12. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 67; Schlesinger, Response to Comments, 47 MD. L. REX'.

113, 114 (1987). The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, § 501, 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982), does
not require any written report of Presidential Findings. Professor Schlesinger relies on
section 654 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2414 (1982), for the proposition
that written findings are required. That Congress did not intend section 654 to apply to
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Professor Schlesinger sees other violations of law. He begins
by noting that the Iran initiative "very likely" violated the Export
Administration Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Omnibus
Anti-Terrorism Act, the National Security Act, the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment, the Boland Amendment, and the Neutrality Act.' 3
Later, however, any doubt vanishes, as he charges: "One reason
why the administration has violated these laws with impunity is that
violation incurs no punishment.... Reagan... evidently supposed
that the election sweep empowered [him] to do whatever [he]
thought necessary for the safety of the Republic without regard to
obligations imposed by the Constitution or by the statute book."' 4
It may be that some laws were violated by the manner in which
the Iran initiative was implemented. This question is being examined thoroughly and soberly by various bodies, and there are as
yet no clear answers. Some of the legal issues raised by the matter
are difficult and close. Yet Professor Schlesinger renders his conclusions about alleged lawbreaking without any analysis of the statutes
allegedly violated and without any recitation of the factual basis for
his conclusions-as though the truth of this gravely serious charge
were self-evident. Nor does Professor Schlesinger bother to note
that any laws which may have been violated were violated by people
who were acting without President Reagan's knowledge or authorization. Instead, he implies that President Reagan personally participated in these alleged violations of law.
How does one explain the errors, distortions, and bold, unsupported assertions of lawbreaking, and the departures they represent
from the scholarly and nuanced analysis for which Professor Schlesinger is justly renowned? The explanation becomes apparent in the
latter half of his paper, but is best captured, I think, in the following
sentence: "When an administration's conduct of foreign affairs is
incoherent, incompetent, duplicitous, and dedicated to rash and
intelligence findings made under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment is rather clearly suggested by the fact that section 654 also requires the Findings to which it applies to be
published in the Federal Register. Congress can hardly have intended that secret intelligence findings be published in the Federal Register. While it is true that section 654
would permit publication of only the fact of the Finding and the section of the Act under
which made, some covert operations could well be so sensitive that the mere publication
of the section of the act under which a Presidential finding was made could in some
circumstances serve to alert a foreign intelligence agency to the possible existence of the
operation.
For a more extensive discussion of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and section 654
of the Foreign Assistance Act, see Legal Authority, supra note 2, at 7-12.
13. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 66.
14. Id. at 68.
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mindless policies, what is so terrible about a crippled Presidency?"' 5
This is the language of editorial pages and fundraising letters, not of
academic enterprise. And when one understands that the nature of
a piece is political rather than academic, one naturally holds the
writer to the standards of political rather than academic debate.
The essence of Professor Schlesinger's complaint then is political. He disagrees with the current administration's policies; therefore the institution of the Presidency should rightly be crippled.
Issues of constitutional authority, however, transcend partisan politics. The Constitution grants the President certain powers, and it
does so irrespective of whether one agrees with the political choices
the President makes. But it is always tempting to couch one's political disagreements in constitutional terms. Professor Schlesinger
has himself observed: "[Niothing has been more characteristic of
the perennial debate [concerning the constitutional allocation of
power between the President and Congress] than the way in which
the same people, in different circumstances and at different points
in their lives, have argued both sides of the issue." 1 6 In his zeal to
denounce President Reagan, Professor Schlesinger has fallen victim
to the same temptation he has criticized.
In particular, Professor Schlesinger's desire to portray President Reagan as having acted illegally has led him to present a distorted view of the constitutional power of the President in the field
of foreign affairs. This is my general objection to his paper-and
ultimately it is the most important one precisely because we should
not allow fundamental issues of constitutional authority to be distorted in the course of partisan political disputes. Thus, I want to
devote the remainder of my comments to addressing the basic constitutional issues. In particular, I want to address what I take to be
Professor Schlesinger's principal constitutional argument: that the
President has no power in the field of foreign affairs independent of
Congress, and that independent Presidential action-particularly if
it is secret-is in some way fundamentally incompatible with the
Constitution and the intention of the framers.' 7 In contrast to Professor Schlesinger, I believe that the Constitution grants the Presi15. Id. at 68-69.
16. Schlesinger, Congressand the Making of American Foreign Polio', 51 FOREIGN AFF. 78,
105 (1972).
17. See Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 62 ("The framers saw foreign policy, not as the
exclusive possession of the President, but as a power shared with Congress ..
"); id. at
70 ("The framers explicitly rejected the idea that the President owned American foreign
policy."); id. at 73 ("So long as we have a messianic foreign policy, any President will be
tempted to develop capabilities for secrecy, disinformation (i.e., lying), covert action,
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dent a dominant, and in some areas, exclusive role in the field of
foreign affairs, and that secrecy-far from being antagonistic to the
Constitution-was understood by the framers as an integral and
necessary part of the conduct of foreign affairs.
As always, we should begin our analysis with the text of the
Constitution. Article II, which creates and defines the office of the
President, begins with the affirmative declaration: "The Executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." 1 8 This is a plenary grant of power, and part of the President's responsibility as Chief Executive is to transact the American
people's business with foreign sovereigns. 19
In contrast to the plenary grant of power to the Executive, the
Constitution grants the legislative branch only specific, enumerated
powers in the field of foreign affairs. For instance, Congress is given
the power "[t]o declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and make rules concerning Capture on Land and Water." 2 ° The
enumerated constitutional grants of power to the legislative branch
to act in the field of foreign affairs limit the plenary grant of power
to the Executive, but only to the extent of the enumerated power.
In the words of Thomas Jefferson: "The transaction of business
with foreign nations is executive altogether; it belongs, then, to the
head of that department, except as to such portions of it as-are specifically submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed
strictly ...
""
The independent and plenary power of the Executive in the
field of foreign affairs has been recognized by the Supreme Court.
The leading case is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.2 2 in
which the Court drew a sharp distinction between the President's
and armed violence that are incompatible with the Constitution of 1787 and that would
undermine and nullify the separation of powers.").
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
19. In addition to this plenary grant of powers, the Constitution also makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, id. at § 2, cl. 1, gives him power to make
treaties and appoint ambassadors, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, id. at
cl. 2, and to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, id. at § 3. The Constitution
also requires that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id.
These specific grants of authority supplement and, to some extent, clarify the plenary
discretion given to the President by the executive power clause.
20. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Congress is also given the power -[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the Law of Nations," id. at cl. 10, and the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, id. at cl.
3. In addition, congressional power to appropriate funds can involve it in questions of
foreign affairs.
21. 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (W. Ford ed. 1895).
22. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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relatively limited inherent powers to act in the domestic sphere and
his far-reaching discretion to act on his own authority in managing
the external relations of the country.2 3 The Court emphatically declared that this discretion derives from the Constitution itself and
that congressional efforts to act in this area must be evaluated in the
light of the President's constitutional ascendancy. As the Court
stated:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing
not alone with an authority vested in the President by an
execution of legislative power, but with such an authority
plus the very delicate plenary and executive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations-a power which does not require
as a basisfor its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course,
like any other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our
international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious
embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved.24
23. The precise issue in Curtiss-JWright was whether a statute granting the President
the power to ban arms shipments to the countries engaged in the Chaco War (Bolivia
and Paraguay) should he make a finding that such a ban would contribute to peace was
an unconstitutional delegation of power by Congress. See id. at 314-15. Thus, the decision has been viewed as a narrow one. Professor Schlesinger, for instance, has stated:
"Its actual holding was restricted. Its expansive contentions were in the nature of obiter

dicta."

A.

SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY

103 (1973) [hereinafter

IMPERIAL

PRESIDENCY].

However, the Court's view of the inherent power of the President was not dicta.
The Court assumed in its analysis of the case that the statute would have been unconstitutional absent the President's inherent power in the field of foreign affairs. See 299 U.S.
at 315. Thus, the Court's expansive view of the President's constitutional power was
essential to its decision.
24. 299 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added). See also Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) (President "possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as the
Nation's organ in foreign affairs."); id. at 109-12 (refusing to read literally a statute that
seemed to require judicial review of a Presidential decision taken pursuant to his discretion to make foreign policy); id. at I I ("It would be intolerable that courts, without the
relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken
on information properly held secret.") (quoted with approval in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
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In explaining why the Constitution granted the President this
plenary and discretionary power, the Court pointed to the need for
unity of purpose, for dispatch, and for secrecy, quoting approvingly
from a report issued by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
in 1816:
The President is the constitutional representative of
the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon
what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest
prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to
the Constitution ....
[The Committee] think[s] the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations [is] calculated to diminish that responsibility and
thereby to impair the best security for the national safety.
The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover,
requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.2 5
Elsewhere in the opinion the Court also stressed the need for
secrecy in the conduct of foreign relations:
[The President], not Congress, has the better opportunity
of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in
the form of diplomatic consular and other officials. Secrecy
in respect of information gathered by them may be highly
necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of
harmful results.2 6
Was the Court incorrect? Is this notion of an Executive who
acts independently and, when necessary, secretly in the conduct of
foreign affairs somehow inconsistent with the constitutional system
of government created by the framers? Not at all. It is instructive to
quote the words of John Jay in The Federalist No. 64:
It seldom happens in the negotiations of treaties of
whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases when the
most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons
possessing it can be relieved from apprehension of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons
25. 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 8 U.S. Sen. Reports, Comm. on Foreign Relations, vol.
8, p. 24 (Feb. 15, 1816)).
26. Id. at 320.
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whether they be actuated by mercenary or friendly motives
and there doubtless are many of both descriptions who
would rely on the secrecy of the President but who would
not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a
large popular assembly. The convention have done well
therefore in so disposing of the power of making treaties
that although the President must in forming them act by
the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to
manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest.
, * , [S]o often and so essentially have we heretofore
suffered from the want of secrecy and dispatch that the
Constitution would have been inexcusably defective if no
attention had been paid to those objects. Those matters
which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and
the most dispatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary
measures which are not otherwise important in a national
view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the
objects of the negotiation. 2 7
Jay's reference to treaties "of whatever nature" and his explicit discussion of intelligence operations make it clear that he was speaking
not of treaty negotiations in the narrow sense, but of the whole process of diplomacy and intelligence gathering.
Alexander Hamilton made similar remarks in explaining why
the House of Representatives was not given a role in the formation
of treaties:
The fluctuating and.., multitudinous composition of that
body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate
and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady
and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decisions, secrecy, and
dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous.28
27. The Federalist No. 64, at 434-35 (.Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
Jay went on to note that "should any circumstance occur which requires the advice and
consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene them." Id. at 436. Jay did not, however, suggest that the President would be obliged to seek such advice and consent for
actions other than those specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
28. Id., No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original). Hamilton was distinguishing the Senate from the House of Representatives in this passage, but his statement reflects his understanding of the qualities inherent in the Executive, qualities
which suited it for the principal role in the conduct of foreign affairs, and of the necessity for secrecy.
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The recognition by the framers of a need for a strong Executive-one who could act independently and with secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs-is hardly surprising given the world in which
they lived. The existence of the United States was still precarious in
1787. When the Constitutional Convention met, the United States
was a weak nation, looking uneasily across the Atlantic at the great
power conflict between England and France-a conflict that was to
result in Washington's unilateral neutrality proclamation in 1793,
naval clashes between the United States and France and England in
the 1790s and early 1800s, and, finally, the War of 1812. Thus, the
framers created an Executive that had the strength and the flexibility
to respond to the exigencies of foreign relations.
That independent Presidential action in the field of foreign affairs is not some recent and unconstitutional aberration is demonstrated by historical practice. Beginning with George Washington
and his unilateral neutrality proclamation,2 9 American Presidents
exercised a forceful independent role in the conduct of foreign affairs, and they acted with secrecy when necessary. Indeed, in defending the Presidency from the charge that it is weakened by our
constitutional system of separation of powers, Professor Schlesinger
remarks: "The separation of powers did not disable Washington or
Jefferson or Jackson or Lincoln or Wilson or Truman or the two
Roosevelts."3 °
Professor Schlesinger is, of course, correct-the constitutional
system of separation of powers did not disable these Presidents in
their conduct of foreign affairs. But it did not disable them precisely
because the Constitution gives the Executive the power to exercise
independent discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. Indeed,
every President that Professor Schlesinger mentions is notable for
having embraced-if not in theory, then in practice-a concept of
independent Presidential prerogative, particularly in the field of foreign affairs.
Even Jefferson, who was generally consistent in expressing the
view that the Constitution granted the Executive only limited powers, exercised much greater authority as President than his theoreti29. Washington's neutrality proclamation engendered controversy both because it
was unilateral and because, arguably, it entailed a repudiation of American obligations
to France under the Treaty of 1778. The controversy led to the famous debate between
Hamilton, writing as "Pacificus," and Madison, writing as "Helvidius," over the extent
of Congress' power to declare war. Portions of their debate are reprinted in E. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 8-27 (1917).
30. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 60.
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cal conception of Executive power would have allowed. A detailed
study by then Professor Abraham Sofaer of Presidential action in the
field of foreign and military affairs during the early history of the
Republic-a study which was praised by Professor Schlesinger"concluded:
Jefferson . . . broadly construed his authority to conduct

foreign and military affairs. He conducted diplomacy with
vigor and secrecy, making informal threats and promises to
obtain concessions. He unilaterally authorized seizures of
armed vessels in waters extending to the Gulf Stream
under circumstances that might have led to conflicts, and
otherwise condoned military movements and actions that
could have caused serious complications.3 2
In general, Professor Sofaer's conclusion was that Jefferson in practice failed "to adhere to the constitutional philosophy he inflicted
upon himself." 3
Similarly, Lincoln, whose 1848 letter on the Mexican War, stating that the Constitution did not give any "one man" the power to
bring the Republic into war,3 4 is quoted approvingly by Professor
Schlesinger, 5 is the President who in 1861-without congressional
authorization-established a military blockade of the southern
ports. Despite the lack of congressional approval, the legality of
Lincoln's blockade was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Prize
Cases.36
The claimants in the Prize Cases were shipowners, including foreigners as well as United States citizens, who argued that Lincoln
had no authority to order the blockade, and thus, that the seizure of
their ships and confiscation of their cargoes were illegal. The Court
rejected these claims, holding that the President had the power independent of Congress to take whatever action he deemed necessary in the circumstances. The Court stated that actions of the
southern states had created a de facto state of war and that "[t]he
President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name." 3 7 Moreover,
31. See IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 23, at 51.
32. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 225 (1976).
33. Id.

34. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herndon (Feb. 15, 1848), repinled in
1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1824-1848, at 451-52 (R. Basler ed.
1953).
35. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 70.
36. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
37. Id. at 669.
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the Court pointed out that whether such a state of insurrection existed was "a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be
governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted." 8 It concluded:
"The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed which demanded and
authorized recourse to such a measure, under the circumstances pe39
culiar to the case."
It is, of course, true that the Prize Cases involved a national
emergency. Nonetheless, the case represents a significant statement
of inherent Presidential power. In The Imperial Presidency, however,
Professor Schlesinger states: "Since the majority in the Prize Cases
confined its endorsement of the war power to the circumstances of
ongoing domestic insurrection (or invasion), it is hard to see, as
later commentators have claimed, that the decision conferred special authority on Presidents in peacetime or in relation to foreign
wars."40
Two points should be made in response to Professor Schlesinger's comment on the Prize Cases. First, although the insurrection
was domestic, the action at issue in the case-the blockade of southern ports and the concomitant seizure of foreign vessels-was international, with significant foreign policy consequences. Indeed, it
was precisely such a blockade and seizure of neutral vessels by the
British that had led to the War of 1812. Second, few would question
the proposition that the President has greater authority to act in the
field of foreign affairs than he does in domestic matters. Thus, to
the extent that the Prize Cases deals solely with the President's domestic powers, it would only suggest that the President would have
even greater powers in an international context. Professor Schlesinger himself, for instance, does not question the constitutionality of
President Kennedy's blockade of Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis
even though he notes that the decision was made in secrecy, without
consultation with congressional leaders, and "by Executive order,
Presidential proclamation and inherent powers, not under any reso' '4
lution or act of Congress. 1
Similar issues arose in 1940 when Franklin Roosevelt, despite
significant congressional opposition, entered into an agreement
whereby United States destroyers were exchanged for the right to
38. Id. at 670 (emphasis in original).
39. Id.
40. IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 23, at 65.
41. Id. at 175 (quoting T. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 702 (1965)).
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use British bases. In his discussion of this episode in The Imperial
Presidency, Professor Schlesinger concludes that the Senate would
not have approved the exchange if it had been submitted to them in
the form of a treaty.4 2 Nonetheless, he concludes that it was not an
"exercise in presidential usurpation." 4 3 While pointing to
Roosevelt's informal consultations with congressional leaders and
with leaders of the opposition party, Professor Schlesinger seems to
place principal emphasis on the state of national emergency that existed and the importance of the destroyer transfer in preventing the
fall of Britain in justifying his conclusion that President Roosevelt
acted constitutionally."
Most of us would agree with Professor Schlesinger's historical
evaluation-there are few today who question the wisdom of
Roosevelt's decision to come to the aid of Britain in 1940.
Roosevelt's judgment has been vindicated by history. But it is important to remember that his judgment was challenged by his contemporaries. As noted above, Professor Schlesinger himself
concedes that Congress did not support Roosevelt's exchange of destroyers for military bases. Similarly, he acknowledges that many
congressional leaders objected to Kennedy's blockade of Cuba.4 5
In my view, the Constitution granted Lincoln the power to order a blockade of southern ports, Roosevelt the power to exchange
destroyers for military bases, and Kennedy the power to blockade
Cuba. 46 It also gave President Kennedy the power to sponsor a se42. Id. at 108 ("To have tried to get destroyers to Britain by the treaty route was an
alternative only for those who did not want Britain to get destroyers at all.").
43. Id. at 109.
44. See id. at 105-09. At the time the destroyer exchange was denounced by many as
an unconstitutional action that violated several statutes. The Department of Justice,
however, in an opinion written by then Attorney General and later Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson concluded that President Roosevelt's action was authorized by the
Constitution and did not violate any statutory prohibitions. See 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484,
489-90 (1940).
In addition to the destroyer exchange, Roosevelt sent troops to Greenland and Iceland in 1941 despite the fact that Congress had provided that members of the forces
inducted under the Selective Service Act, ch. 720, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 886 (1940), might be
sent only to U.S. territories or countries within the Western Hemisphere. See L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

106 & n.42 (1972). In his discussion of these

actions in The ImperialPresidency, Professor Schlesinger does not mention the existence of
the statute, but notes cryptically that only Robert Taft and one other Senator oblected to
the dispatch of troops to Iceland, even though Iceland "was not, like Greenland, part of
the [Western] [Hiemisphere." See IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 23, at I 11.
45. IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 23, at 175. At least some objected because they
wanted more vigorous action-an invasion rather than a blockade. Id.
46. It is important to keep in mind, however, that with the possible exception of the
destroyer exchange, there appears to have existed no contrary legislation in any of these
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cret military action against Cuba in an attempt to overthrow its government-as he did in the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. I
reach this conclusion, however, not because of any judgment as to
the merits of those actions-the Bay of Pigs invasion, for instance, is
now universally condemned as an ill-conceived and ill-executed action-but because the Constitution grants the President the power
to exercise independent discretion in the area of foreign affairs.4 7
The Constitution grants the President that power because the
framers recognized that the conduct of foreign policy above all
other exercises of sovereignty requires the characteristics of the Ex48
ecutive-in Hamilton's words, "decision, secrecy and dispatch."
Thus, the Constitution committed the direction of our foreign policy to the discretion of the President. Whether the President exercises that discretion wisely is a question to be answered ultimately
by the judgment of history. But there is no doubt that under the
Constitution the direction of our foreign policy is within his
discretion.

situations. The existence of any such legislation would necessarily alter the analysis of
Presidential power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-38
(Jackson, J., concurring).
47. Professor Schlesinger himself participated in the planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion and provides an extensive discussion of the event in A. SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 250-97 (1965). He concludes that,
in hindsight, the invasion was unwise, but nowhere suggests that he thinks it was unconstitutional. His later work, The Imperial Presidency, contains only a passing reference to
the Bay of Pigs invasion.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 415 (A. Hamilton) (G. Smith ed. 1901) (emphasis
omitted).

